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The  objective  of this  research  is  to give  insights  into  the  production,  income  and  environmental  effects  of
the introduction  of  a ﬂat rate  for Dutch  agriculture  that  is  lower  than  the  present  average  direct  income
payment.  For  this  purpose,  a  detailed  agri-environmental  programming  model  for Dutch  agriculture  is
used.
Results of  a ﬂat  rate scenario  are  compared  to a reference  scenario  comparing  agricultural  production
in  the Netherlands  in 2020  in  a situation  without  a ﬂat rate. Results  show  that  total  gross  margin  in
Dutch  agriculture  decreases  because  of  the  ﬂat  rate  with  7%.  The  supply  of starch  potatoes  and  cowncome volatility
EL classiﬁcation:
1
8
milk  decreases  most.  Production  of seed  and  consumption  potatoes,  vegetables  and  intensive  livestock
products  increases  slightly.  This  is  largely  due  to a shift  of farm  payments  from  milk and  starch  potatoes
production  to arable  crops  and  vegetable  production.  It  was  found  that  including  risk  aversion  of  income
volatility  ampliﬁes  these  effects.  In  the  ﬂat rate  scenario  total  emissions  of nutrients  from  agricultural
production  to the  environment  decreases.
 Roya© 2013
. Introduction
In November 2010, the European Commission presented three
otential paths for the design of the Common Agricultural Pol-
cy (CAP) in the programming period 2014-2020 (European
ommission, 2010). The outlined policy options for a future CAP
ncluded the status quo with some slight adaptations, a shift
owards a greening of the CAP and a more radical reform with
 phasing out of direct payments. In October 2011 the European
ommission presented a proposal that besides greening includes
onverging farm payments (European Commission, 2011). In 2013
he European Parliament, the EU Council of Ministers and the Euro-
ean Commission have reached an agreement on reforming the CAP
ost 2013 in which steps are taken to converge the direct income
ayments between and within Member States. A country cannot
eceive less than 75% of the Community average by 2019 and within
 given member state or region aid per hectare may  not be less than
0% of the average of the aid disbursed by 2019 in a single admin-
strative or agronomic area (European Commission, 2013). This
greement is the result of the wish of the Commission to strive for
ore equity in the level of farm payments between Member States
e.g. European Commission, 2007, 2010 and 2011). Currently, farm
ayments per ha vary strongly among Member States. The average
∗ Corresponding author.
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farm payment in the EU15 is 295 euro per ha against 187 euro per
ha in the new Member States (Helming and Terluin, 2011). In the
Netherlands the average farm payment equals about 440 euro per
ha (Jongeneel et al., 2011). It is to be expected that a CAP reform will
lead for the Netherlands to less support and an increase in income
uncertainty.
In the Netherlands the farm payment per individual farm per ha
can differ substantially from the national average. Farm payments
per farm type in the Netherlands range from 90 euro per ha on
horticultural farms to 610 euro per ha on starch potato farms. Also
between dairy farms farm payments per ha can differ substantially,
largely depending on the historic level of milk production per ha.
Farm payments in the Netherlands are supposed to be decou-
pled from production. However, from the literature it is found
that decoupled payments can still affect production, especially
through changes in risk attitude and land values. Helming et al.
(2010) give an extensive overview of theoretical and empirical
evidence concerning the impact of decoupled payments on pro-
duction. Land values are affected as the decoupled payments are at
least partly capitalised in land rents and this in turn affects produc-
tion and investment decisions of farmers. Hence, depending on the
behaviour of farmers, a policy switch towards more equity in farm
payments per ha at EU level could potentially have a large impact
on production and income and its distribution in Dutch agriculture.
Moreover, it could also affect the impact of agriculture on the envi-
ronment. In this paper equity in the level of farm payments per ha
is assumed to take the form of a ﬂat rate per ha at a level lower than
the present average in the Netherlands.
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The objective of this paper is to determine production, income
nd environmental effects of a ﬂat rate in combination with
ncreased income uncertainty on different farm types in the
etherlands.
Many agricultural sector models incorporate farm payments
nd their effect on agricultural output (Balkhausen et al., 2008; Britz
t al., 2006). However, these models do not incorporate differences
n farm structure, related differences in farm payments and possible
ifferences in behaviour of individual farmers. Other studies apply
arm level or micro models (Baptiste et al., 2010; Marchand et al.,
008; Shrestha et al., 2007) that include individual farm behaviour
nd differences in farm structure and farm payments. A disadvan-
age of these models is that interactions between farms are not or
nly partly included. Moreover, as not all farms are represented,
onclusions at agricultural sector level are lacking. Finally, none of
hese studies include impacts of changes in risk attitude on pro-
uction.
In this research a detailed agricultural model of Dutch agri-
ulture (the Dutch Regionalised Agricultural Model (DRAM)) is
ombined with the CAPRI model. DRAM features a large number
f agricultural activities, farm types, interactions between activ-
ties and farm types through land and animal manure markets,
egions and environmental indicators especially focusing on the
missions of nutrients from mineral fertilizer and animal manure
o the environment. Manure markets in DRAM also include trans-
ortation of animal manure between regions in the Netherlands
nd exports. Prices of agricultural outputs and purchased inputs,
ields and fertilization requirement per farm type, activity and
egion are assumed constant. Availability of agricultural land is
xed at NUTS 2 level in DRAM. If policy scenarios imply changing
rices of agricultural outputs and inputs, yields and fertilization
equirements these are taken from CAPRI and then included in
RAM. Gocht et al. (2011) apply the CAPRI model to analyse the
ffects of a EU wide ﬂat rate scenario. The CAPRI model represents
he major farm types in the EU. Moreover, prices of outputs and a
elected number of inputs are endogenously modelled through an
terative link between a supply and a partial equilibrium market
odule.
For the purpose of this paper DRAM is extended with a risk mod-
le that enables to analyse what the consequences are of income
olatility due to the reform of the CAP in combination with farmers’
isk aversion.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section
 of this paper describes the scenarios. Section 3 describes DRAM
nd the modelling of income volatility and risk aversion of farmers
n more detail. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents the
esults and we conclude with a general discussion and conclusions
n Section 6.
. Scenarios
As it is likely that income effects of a ﬂat rate on EU level will
e large for Member States and farms, it is not realistic to assume
hat an EU ﬂat rate per ha will be implemented in the short term.
ransition towards an EU ﬂat rate per ha at EU level can only be
eached gradually, giving farmers time to adjust. In this study we
ssume that the policy transition is completed and the EU ﬂat rate
s fully effective in 2020.
.1. Reference scenarioThe reference scenario takes into account the effects of
utonomous changes in exogenous variables, e.g. technological
hange, input and output prices, etc., until 2020. Data used come
rom other studies such as Scenar 2020 and Scenar 2020-II or fromurnal of Life Sciences 68 (2014) 53– 60
projections of international institutes like OECD and FAO. The ref-
erence scenario further incorporates the 2003 CAP reform and the
abolition of the milk quota system in 2015. We also include the
implementation of the Health Check, which among other things
implies a 10% reduction in farm payments. With respect to the
budget for the CAP, we  assume that this remains constant in nom-
inal terms. All farm payments are decoupled. A possible WTO
agreement on trade liberalisation is not included given the lack
of information how this agreement would look.
2.2. Flat rate scenario
The ﬂat rate scenario assumes a switch from the current farm
payments to one ﬂat rate per ha for all utilized agricultural area
in the Netherlands in 2020. All other variables are kept constant
compared to the reference scenario. Given the uncertainty con-
cerning the EU budget and the eligible acreages, the ﬂat rate in
2020 is assumed to be equal to D 240 per ha in nominal terms. This
is between values used in Gocht et al. (2011) and Kleinhanss (2011).
3. The Dutch Regionalised Agricultural Model
3.1. DRAM
In order to analyse the impact of the ﬂat rate for different
types of farms in the Netherlands, the Dutch Regionalised Agri-
cultural Model (DRAM) is used. DRAM has been developed as an
activity-based, comparative static, partial equilibrium, regionalized
mathematical programming model of Dutch agriculture (Helming,
2005; Helming and van Berkum, 2008; Helming and Reinhard,
2009). Agricultural production in DRAM is described in terms of
agricultural activities that can be further differentiated by tech-
nologies. The objective function of DRAM maximises income from
agricultural activities, i.e. total gross margin, under technologi-
cal and market constraints. In this research activities in DRAM
are aggregated to the level of 12 provinces (NUTS 2 level). DRAM
distinguishes between 35 agricultural activities. These activities
can be divided between 20 crop activities (soft wheat, rye, barley,
oats, granule, other cereals, oil crops, legumes, sugar beets, other
arable crops, fodder maize, grassland, other fodder crops, vegeta-
bles (arable), seed potatoes, consumption potatoes, starch potatoes,
seeds, other arable crops and green manuring) and 15 livestock
activities (female beef cattle, male beef cattle, meat calves, fattening
pigs, sows, meat poultry, laying hens and eight dairy cow activities).
DRAM can endogenously choose between 8 types of dairy cow
activities to produce milk. It is assumed that they represent 8
types of specialized dairy farms or technologies in the Netherlands
(Table 1). The amount of land per head per type of dairy cow is ﬁxed
in DRAM, but the average national or regional amount of land per
dairy cow is endogenous. Moreover, arable crop activities are split
into two technologies. The differentiation is based on the farm pay-
ment per ha per individual farm as found in the FADN, as differences
in farm payments is the focus of our research. One technology in
DRAM represents arable farms with a relatively high farm payment
per ha and one technology represents arable farms with a relatively
low farm payment per ha. The level of payments differs because of
productivity differences and differences in cropping plan.
The introduction of a ﬂat rate per ha will affect production in
DRAM through:
• The linkage with CAPRI provides the agricultural output and
input prices, land availability, yields and fertilization require-
ments used in DRAM for both scenarios. The differences in the
values of these variables between both scenarios affect the model
outcomes;
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Table  1
Type of dairy farms represented by the dairy cow activities included in DRAM.
Type of dairy farm Type of dairy farm in DRAM Milk production (kg per dairy cow) Dairy cows (heads per ha) Dairy cows (heads per farm)
Small and extensive dairy farm dairy 1 < 7,450 < 1.6 < 60
dairy  3 < 7,450 > 1.6 < 60
Small and intensive dairy farm dairy 5 > 7,450 < 1.6 < 60
dairy  7 > 7,450 > 1.6 < 60
Large and extensive dairy farm dairy 2 < 7,450 < 1.6 > 60
•
•
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adairy  6 > 7,450 
Large and intensive dairy farm dairy 4 < 7,450 
dairy  8 > 7,450 
The farm payments in DRAM are capitalised into land values.
Hence, the lowering and redistribution of farm payments affects
the shadow prices of land and this in turn will affect the alloca-
tion of land to the different activities. With the ﬂat rate land will
shift from farm types (technologies) with initial high farm pay-
ments towards farm types (technologies) with initial low farm
payments per ha keeping everything else constant.
Changes in risk attitude due to changes in income uncertainty.
.2. CAPRI
CAPRI is a partial equilibrium, mathematical programming,
egionalised, activity based, model of EU agriculture. It includes a
upply and demand module of the different agricultural commodi-
ies and is extensively described in the literature (e.g. Britz et al.,
006). Besides the prices of agricultural commodities and feeding
tuffs, yield and fertilization requirements per activity are endoge-
ous in CAPRI. The latter is reached through the deﬁnition of an
xtensive and intensive technology type per activity. Depending
n relative price changes land allocation might switch from one
echnology to the other. CAPRI features an upward sloping land
upply curve. This allows for land leaving and entering the agricul-
ural sector in response to relative price changes (Renwick et al.,
013).
Per NUTS 2 region, activity and commodity, the following vari-
bles from CAPRI are incorporated in DRAM as percentage changes
o the reference: a) prices of agricultural commodities b) feeding
osts per activity c) yield and fertilization requirements per activity
nd d) availability of agricultural land.
.3. Incorporating risk and uncertainty in DRAM
To include risky income and aversion of farmers to income vari-
nce the income optimization problem becomes1:
ax  z = c′x − x′
∑
C
x (1)
Where: c¯ vector of average gross margins2 per activity (D /ha
r D /head), x vector of activity levels (1,000 ha or 1,000 heads),
 risk-aversion parameter per activity (D 1/10,000), ˙c variance
ovariance matrix of gross margins (D 10,000).
In case of risk neutrality  is zero and we have the original
ncome maximisation problem.Following Howitt (2002) and Kaiser and Messer (2011) the risk-
version parameter can be calculated for an individual activity
ssuming that a farmer minimizes the variance of the gross margin
1 For reason of simplicity the index for farm types (f), activities (i) and regions (r)
re not included.
2 Here we assume that gross margin equals income.< 1.6 > 60
> 1.6 > 60
> 1.6 > 60
subject to a stated minimum gross margin. The risk-aversion
parameter can be calculated by solving the following problem:
min  x′˙cx (2)
Subject to:
c′x≥e∗ [] (3)
Where: x′˙cx is the variance of the gross margin, e* is the stated
minimum gross margin,  is the shadow price of the constraint.
It is shown by Howitt (2002) that the shadow price of the con-
straint (3)  is equal to (1/). There is a trade-off between expected
income (E) and variance of income (x′˙cx or V) in case of risk aver-
sion. A decision maker prefers a plan with a higher V only if E is also
larger, and E must rise at an increasing rate relative to increases in
V. The E-V frontier showing the optimal combination of expected
income (E) and variance of income (V) can be generated by solving
equations (2) and (3) for a range of e* values (Howitt, 2002). The
shadow price of the constraint (3) () is low and the risk-aversion
parameter () is high (i.e. high level of risk aversion) when a change
in expected income (E) leads to a relative low change in the variance
of income (V) (Howitt, 2002).
3.4. The PMP model with risk aversion
DRAM is calibrated in such a way that in the base run the model
outcomes exactly represents the actual situation. In doing so the
approach of Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) is used
(Howitt, 2002). There are several PMP  techniques but usually cost
functions are speciﬁed that force the activities to their actual level.
In DRAM quadratic cost functions are speciﬁed that are calibrated
using exogenous supply elasticities (Helming, 2005). Including the
risk-aversion parameter and the gross margin variance, i.e. the cost
of risk, the quadratic cost functions in DRAM change to3:
K =  + ˛x + 0.5ˇx2 + x˙cx (4)
Where: K is cost and  and  are parameters to be calculated.
Assuming  and xcx known and using exogenous supply elas-
ticities, the parameters  and  can be calculated such that the
observed activity level, for every individual activity, is reproduced
(Helming, 2005):
 ˇ = mc
εx
− 2˙c (5)
 ˛ = mc(ε − 1)/ε (6)
Where: mc marginal cost including the opportunity cost of the
calibration constraint in the ﬁrst phase of PMP,  supply elasticity.
This way the model with cost function K exactly calibrates
towards the observed activity level. Note that by assuming in the
calibration the cost component linked to risk constant the price
3 For reason of simplicity the index for farm types (f), activities (i) and regions (r)
are  not included.
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Table 2
Farm payments per farm type in the Netherlands in 2007 (euro per ha).
Dairy farm type 1 408 Dairy farm type 6 533
Dairy farm type 2 470 Dairy farm type 7 715
Dairy farm type 3 589 Dairy farm type 8 779
Dairy farm type 4 636 Arable farm type 1 281
Dairy farm type 5 489 Arable farm type 2 420
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ource: DRAM
lasticity used in the calibration is different from the price elastic-
ty of the model in simulations because in the latter case the cost
inked to risk is not constant.
. Data
.1. Farm data
The average farm payments per ha per farm type in the
etherlands in the base period as included in DRAM are presented
n Table 2. For the different types of dairy farms the farm payments
er ha in the base period are based on 2007 data from the Dutch
ADN. The farm payments for all other farms include formerly cou-
led ha payments for fodder maize, different kind of beef premiums
nd slaughter premiums, excluding slaughter premiums for veal
alves. Slaughter premiums for veal calves are linked to farms with
eal calves. Total farm payments in the Netherlands equal D 853
illion. It is assumed that in nominal terms in the reference sce-
ario in 2020 the direct payment per activity will be equal to the
irect payment in the base period (2007).
Table 3 shows the cropping plan of both arable farm types in the
ase period. Shares are based on 2007 data as found in the Dutch
ADN, total acreages are based on the 2008 agricultural census. The
hare of cereals (especially barley) and starch potatoes is relatively
arge on Arable farm type 2 (relative high payment per ha) and
elatively small on Arable farm type 1 (relative low payment per
a).
Agricultural prices and technical input-output coefﬁcients are
s much as possible based on individual farm data from the Dutch
ADN of 2007. The different types of arable farms in DRAM differ
ith respect to farm payments per ha, but input-output coefﬁcients
re identical per crop per arable farm type per region. The supply
lasticities used to calibrate quadratic cost function (4) are assumed
qual to 2.0 for arable crop activities, 1.0 for vegetables, 0.75 for
ll cattle activities (beef cattle, meat calves and dairy cows) and
.75 for all intensive livestock activities (sows, fattening pigs, laying
able 3
and use per crop and average cropping plan of Arable farm type 1 and Arable farm
ype 2 in the Netherlands in 2007.
Arable farm type 1 Arable farm type 2
Ha  (*1,000) Share (%) Ha (*1,000) Share (%)
Soft wheat 82 26 75 29
Barley 21 6 30 12
Other cereals 18 6 18 7
Total cereals 121 38 123 48
Oil  seeds 2 1 2 1
seed potatoes 31 10 6 2
Consumption potatoes 50 16 19 8
Starch potatoes 12 4 35 14
Sugar beets 39 12 34 13
Vegetables 42 13 12 5
Other arable crops 22 7 25 10
Total arable crops 319 100 254 100
ource: DRAMurnal of Life Sciences 68 (2014) 53– 60
hens and meat poultry). These supply elasticities are large as in the
long to medium term farmers can react relatively easy to changes.
DRAM is not a forecasting model, but is developed to analyse
counterfactual scenarios. To ﬁnd a good starting point for the
acreage of arable crops and number of animals in 2020 in the
reference scenario, the calibration procedure as described in
Section 3 can be applied. This needs however an input ﬁle with
regional activity levels in 2020. The acreages of arable crops and
the number of animals per region in 2020 in the reference scenario
are calibrated to acreages found in Silvis et al. (2009). The share of
the two types of arable farms in total acreage per crop is assumed
equal to the observed shares in 2007. An alternative would be
to calibrate DRAM to the CAPRI 2020 baseline. A disadvantage
however is that CAPRI activities do not fully match with DRAM
activities. Moreover, an advantage of Silvis et al. (2009) is that
more detailed information on Dutch agriculture is included e.g.
the impact of manure policy on activity levels.
4.2. Variance of gross margin and risk-aversion parameter in the
reference scenario
By solving equations (2) and (3) activity speciﬁc risk-aversion
parameters are calculated for the reference scenario. The standard
variances of the gross margins of the activities are derived from
FADN data over the six year period 2005-2010 at national level and
then corrected for regional and type speciﬁc differences in aver-
age yield. For example, to ﬁnd the gross margin variance per dairy
cow per type per region, the national average standard deviation
(square root of variance) per dairy cow is multiplied with the ratio
between the milk production per cow per type per region to the
national average milk production per cow. It is further assumed
that covariances are zero.
The minimum expected gross margin (e*) is calculated as the
expected average income in the reference scenario:
e∗ = c¯xref (7)
Where xref is the 2020 reference activity level. This formulation
guarantees that the activity level in the optimal solution of the min-
imization problem given by Eqs. (2) and (3) is equal to the calibrated
activity level in DRAM in 2020 in the reference scenario.
Variance of gross margin and risk-aversion parameter in the ﬂat
rate scenario
The variances of the gross margins (c) and the average gross
margin (c¯) per farm type, activity and region (excluding farm pay-
ments) in the ﬂat rate scenario are assumed equal to the reference
scenario. However we  want to take into account that a change in
expected income due to changes in farm payments can alter the
risk attitude of farmers. Therefore it is assumed that the mini-
mum  expected gross margin (e*) is different in the ﬂat rate scenario
compared to the reference scenario. This leads to a change in the
risk-aversion parameter. Here we assume arbitrarily that the min-
imum expected gross margin is equal to the average gross margin
in 2020 in the reference scenario minus the expected value (both
with a probability of 0.5) of a maximal accepted difference from the
average gross margin in 2020 (maxdifc) and the farm payment in
the ﬂat rate scenario in 2020 (dpﬂat). So, e* is calculated as:
e∗ = (c¯ − 0.5(max dif c − dpflat))xref (8)
Compared to the reference scenario, the minimum expected
gross margin e* goes down when the maximal accepted difference
increases or the farm payments in 2020 decrease. The new optimal
activity level decreases along the EV frontier and the risk-aversion
parameter increases. The farmer becomes more risk averse. The
minimum expected gross margin e* increases when the maximal
accepted difference decreases and the farm payments increase.
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Table  4
National average of risk-aversion parameter () and coefﬁcient of relative risk-aversion in the reference and ﬂat rate scenario and national average coefﬁcient1 of variation
in  the reference scenario.
Reference Flat rate
Risk- aversion parameter ()2 Relative risk aversion Coefﬁcient of variation Risk- aversion parameter ()2 Relative risk aversion
Dairy farm type 1 11.2 12.2 0.31 11.9 12.3
Dairy  farm type 2 3.1 16.3 0.25 3.3 16.3
Dairy  farm type 3 22.1 14.2 0.27 23.8 14.2
Dairy  farm type 4 2.0 10.5 0.31 2.2 10.6
Dairy  farm type 5 4.9 17.2 0.24 5.1 17.2
Dairy  farm type 6 2.7 16.9 0.24 2.9 16.9
Dairy  farm type 7 7.5 8.1 0.35 8.6 8.1
Dairy  farm type 8 2.1 7.0 0.47 2.4 7.2
Arable  Farm Type 1
Soft wheat 4.1 3.3 0.55 4.2 3.3
Barley  24.1 6.6 0.40 25.8 6.6
Sugar  Beet 37.9 34.1 0.17 38.2 34.0
Vegetable 0.5 3.3 0.56 0.5 3.3
Seed  Potatoes 5.4 13.4 0.28 5.4 13.4
Consumption potatoes 2.1 9.5 0.35 2.1 9.5
Starch  potatoes 127.3 18.3 0.24 137.5 18.4
Arable  Farm Type 2
Soft wheat 4.5 3.3 0.56 4.9 3.3
Barley  16.3 6.7 0.40 19.2 6.7
Sugar  Beet 43.5 34.0 0.17 45.2 33.9
Vegetable 1.8 3.3 0.56 1.8 3.3
Seed  Potatoes 28.6 12.7 0.29 28.9 12.7
Consumption potatoes 5.2 9.6 0.34 5.2 9.6
Starch  potatoes 42.1 18.8 0.24 48.8 19.0
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higher yields and revenues and a relatively low share of farm
payments per ha in the reference scenario4. Productivity per
ha of cereals increases with about 1%. Changes in fertilization
requirements follow the yield changes. Yield changes and changes
4 Note that DRAM does not make a distinction between intensive and exten-
sive technologies as CAPRI does. We implicitly assume that within the technologies: The ratio of the standard deviation of the gross margin to the value of the gross ma
f  gross margins between activities. 2: To be divided by 10,000.
he new optimal activity level will increase and the risk-aversion
arameter will decrease. The farmer becomes less risk averse.
In this study we assume that maxdifc per farm type per activ-
ty per region is equal to the corresponding farm payment in the
eference scenario (dpref). Notice further that equation (8) equals
quation (7) when maxdifc would equal dpﬂat. So, everything else
eing equal (activity levels, variances of the gross margin), the
loser dpref is to dpﬂat the less change in risk attitude we expect.
Table 4 shows the national average risk-aversion parameter ()
nd the coefﬁcient of relative risk-aversion in the reference and ﬂat
ate scenario and the national average coefﬁcient of variation in the
eference scenario for some selected activities. The risk-aversion
arameters cannot be compared between activities as these also
epend on the activity level. Instead the coefﬁcients of relative risk-
version are used to compare the risk aversion between activities
Lien, 2002). The coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is calculated
s:
r = 2e∗ (9)
Where ar is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. The coefﬁ-
ient of relative risk aversion has no dimension and empirically
ften a value between 0 (hardly risk averse) and 7.5 (very risk
verse) is assumed (Chavas and Holt, 1996).
Within the group of dairy farms, the coefﬁcient of variation is
elatively high on dairy farms that are characterised by relative high
ilk production per cow. This is understandable as gross margins
n these farm types are relatively more sensitive to ﬂuctuations
n the milk price. The differences in risk aversion between dairy
arm types correspond with the differences in the coefﬁcient of
ariation; farms with high milk production per cow are less risk
verse compared to farms with low milk production per cow.
With respect to arable farm activities, the coefﬁcient of vari-
tion of consumption potatoes and vegetable crops is relatively
igh and growers are less risk averse than other arable farmers.
his is as expected. The relative low level of the coefﬁcient of rela-
ive risk aversion and high coefﬁcient of variation for cereals (soft
heat and barley) are maybe more surprising but can be explainedhe coefﬁcient of variation has no dimension and can be used to compare variability
by the estimation period. The estimation period includes relative
high prices for arable crops in 2007 and relative low prices in 2005
and 2009. Compared to the past, cereals are now a much more
risky crop. The ﬂat rate scenario in general has little effect on the
coefﬁcients of relative risk-aversion for the selected activities in
Table 4.
For quite a number of activities the coefﬁcients of relative risk
aversion exceed 7.5 indicating a very high level of risk-aversion.
Although 7.5 is often taken as an upper limit in empirical research,
higher values are not uncommon (Chavas and Holt, 1996). Despite
this we might overestimate risk aversion.
5. Results
CAPRI results show that price effects of the ﬂat rate scenario
are in general very small. The largest price effect is found for cere-
als, namely +1%. The small price effects are due to the fact that
in the reference scenario all farm payments are assumed decou-
pled from production. So the supply effect is relatively small. The
average yield change in the Netherlands as a whole is largest for
grassland, namely +2% in the ﬂat rate scenario as compared to the
reference scenario.
This yield effect in CAPRI is explained by the shift from
grassland with extensive technologies towards grassland with
intensive technologies in CAPRI. The latter are characterized bydistinguished in DRAM there are also differences in yield and input use due to dif-
ferences in intensity. The average yield and input changes per activity in CAPRI are
assumed equal to corresponding average yield and input changes per activity per
technology in DRAM. See Helming, Oudendag and Zimmermann (2011) for further
discussion of DRAM and CAPRI.
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Table 5
Acreages per crop and number of animals in 2020 in the different scenarios (*1000 ha or head).
Reference Flat rate scenario Difference between reference and ﬂat rate scenario
Activity level Risk-aversion parameter
equal to reference
Risk-aversion
parameter
adjusted
Risk-aversion parameter
equal to reference
Risk-aversion
parameter adjusted
Soft wheat (ha) 137 133 131 -2.9% -4.0%
Barley (ha) 64 59 56 -6.7% -11.9%
Other cereals (ha) 60 58 60 -2.7% -0.1%
Total  cereals (ha) 261 251 248 -3.8% -5.0%
Oil  seeds (ha) 2 2 2 -7.0% -0.5%
Seed  potatoes (ha) 31 31 31 0.2% 0.1%
Consumption potatoes (ha) 62 62 62 0.0% 0.3%
Starch potatoes (ha) 43 40 37 -8.0% -14.1%
Vegetables (ha) 103 104 104 0.2% 0.6%
Total  arable crops (ha) 606 591 586 -2.6% -3.4%
Grassland (ha) 942 913 904 -3.0% -4.0%
Fodder maize (ha) 234 220 217 -5.8% -7.2%
Total  roughage crops (ha) 1,175 1,133 1,121 -3.6% -4.6%
Total  agricultural land (ha) 1,782 1,724 1,707 -3.2% -4.2%
Dairy  cows (head) 1,589 1,524 1,496 -4.1% -5.8%
Beef  cattle (head) 279 280 280 0.5% 0.5%
Fattening pigs (head) 5,719 5,780 5,780 1.1% 1.1%
Sows  (head) 1,197 1,211 1,211 1.1% 1.1%
Meat  poultry (head)1 467 470 470 0.7% 0.7%
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n fertilization requirements per activity can be different per region.
APRI results also show quite some regional differences in agri-
ultural land demand and supply changes, ranging from about
% in arable regions in the north, middle and south-west of the
etherlands to between -3% and -6% in livestock regions in the east
nd the south.
Table 5 shows the impact of the ﬂat rate scenario on allocation
f land to the different crops and the number of animals in Dutch
griculture. To analyse the isolated effect of the changes in the
isk-aversion parameter, results are presented with and without
hanges in the risk-aversion parameter going from the reference to
he ﬂat rate scenario.
The effect of the ﬂat rate scenario on allocation of land to arable
rops is mostly explained by the cropping shares of the two  arable
arm types. The arable farm type with relatively high direct pay-
ents per ha (Arable farm type 2) has a relatively large share of
arley and starch potatoes in its cropping plan, while the share of
eed and consumption potatoes and vegetable crops is relatively
ow. After the policy shock, the average cropping plan develops in
he direction of the cropping plan of Arable farm type 1. Arable farm
ype 1 has relatively a high share of seed and consumption potatoes
nd vegetables in its cropping plan.
Farm payments per ha are relatively high on the different types
f dairy farms. As a result of the ﬂat rate scenario the number of
airy cows decreases compared to the reference scenario.
Including gross margin volatility in combination with changes in
he risk-aversion parameter ampliﬁes the different effects. The total
creage of cereals and especially starch potatoes further decreases
hile the acreage of consumption potatoes and vegetables fur-
her increases. Taking into account the changes in the risk-aversion
arameter, the decrease in the number of dairy cows equals almost
%. Total acreage of arable crops in the Netherlands decreases with
bout 3.4%, while the acreage of fodder crops decreases with about
.6%. Land allocated to silage maize decreases with more than 7%.
The number of animals in the intensive livestock industry in the
etherlands increases in the ﬂat rate scenario. This is explained by
he small increase in the price of intensive livestock products, while
he price of feed stuffs is hardly affected.
The regional effects per province (NUTS 2 region) can be very
ifferent from the national average in the Netherlands. In the ﬂat
ate scenario, production and acreages of arable crops especially566 0.9% 0.9%
decrease in provinces with a high share of starch potatoes and
barley in their arable cropping plan. As a result total acreages of
arable crops especially decreases in Groningen (-14%), Drenthe (-
15%) and Overijssel (-12%). In other provinces acreages of arable
crops increases at the expense of fodder crops originally grown on
dairy farms and the remaining farm types. This is especially the case
in Friesland (+3%), Utrecht (+5%) and Noord-Brabant (+6%).
The changes in the number of dairy cows can also be very dif-
ferent per province, ranging from -2% in Drenthe to about -7% in
other provinces in the Netherlands.
Table 6 shows the impact of the ﬂat rate scenario on the land
use in ha per farm type. The decrease in the total acreage of land
allocated to dairy farms is mainly coming from the decrease in the
acreage of land allocated to Dairy farm type 3, Dairy farm type 4,
Dairy farm type 7, and Dairy farm type 8. These are dairy farm types
with initially a relatively high number of dairy cows, milk produc-
tion and direct payments per ha in the reference scenario. Again,
including gross margin volatility in combination with changes in
the risk-aversion parameter ampliﬁes the different effects in Dutch
dairy farming. The production technology on the average dairy farm
in the Netherlands will be less intensive in the ﬂat rate scenario as
compared to the reference scenario.
Including the changes in the risk-aversion parameter, the
acreage of land allocated to Arable farm type 1 (with relatively low
average farm payments per ha, see Table 2) increases with 1.2%
while the acreage of land allocated to Arable farm type 2 (average
farm payment per ha relatively high) decreases with 9.5%. Land allo-
cated to the remaining farm type is in the ﬂat rate scenario almost
equal to the reference scenario.
Taking into account changes in the risk-aversion parameter,
land shifts and changes in number animals per farm type, the total
income effect of the ﬂat rate scenario ranges from -10% for Dairy
farm type 1 and 5 to -22% for Dairy farm type 7 and 8. Average
income of Arable farm type 1 increases with 0.6% while average
income of Arable farm type 2 decreases with 10%. Total income at
remaining farm types increases with about 4%. Income in Dutch
agriculture, as included in DRAM, as a whole decreases with about
7%.
Table 7 shows that in the ﬂat rate scenario the total N surplus
at soil level and the total ammonia emissions to the environment
in the Netherlands decrease compared to the reference. This can be
J. Helming, J. Peerlings / NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 68 (2014) 53– 60 59
Table  6
Total acreage per farm type in the Netherlands in 2020 in the reference scenario and the different ﬂat rate scenarios.
Farm type Reference (1,000 ha) Flat rate Farm type Reference (1,000 ha) Flat rate
Risk-aversion parameter
adjusted:
Risk-aversion parameter
adjusted:
No  Yes No Yes
Total dairy farms 973 -3.9% -5.6% total arable farms 606 -2.6% -3.4%
dairy  farm: type 1 56 -2.7% -3.5% arable farm: type 1 345 0.6% 1.2%
type  2 210 -3.1% -4.4% type 2 262 -6.8% -9.5%
type  3 21 -4.6% -6.4% remaining farms 202 -1.9% 0.0%
type  4 179 -5.0% -7.1% total agriculture 1,782 -3.2% -4.2%
type  5 114 -3.0% -3.8%
type 6 211 -3.3% -4.9%
type 7 49 -6.0% -8.7%
type 8 132 -4.9% -7.4%
Source: DRAM
Table 7
Nitrate balance of the Dutch agriculture (totals) in 2020 in the ﬂat rate scenario
(indices, reference is 100).
Flat rate scenario Risk-aversion
parameter adjusted:
No Yes
Mineral fertilizer 99.2 99.6
Animal manure 96.6 95.3
Uptake with harvested crops 98.0 96.9
Surplus at soil level 96.7 97.5
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argely explained by the decrease in the number of dairy cows. As a
esult of the decrease of the agricultural land supply, the emissions
re produced on less agricultural land.
On average dairy farms become less intensive. This aver-
ge change towards less dairy cows per ha and less extensive
roduction technologies, increases the opportunity for dairy
armers to further decrease their nutrients surplus at soil level
nd emissions of nitrogen to the environment (Daatselaar et al.,
010). Baptiste et al. (2010) also found that decoupling has a
ositive impact on the scores of dairy farming on environmental
riteria. Moreover, the decreased land demand for agricultural
roduction, opens extra opportunities for the government and
ature organizations for the production of public goods.
. Discussion and conclusions
Using the agricultural sector model DRAM of Dutch agriculture
t is shown that the policy switch from farm payments based on his-
orical entitlements towards a ﬂat rate has a large effect on income
n Dutch agriculture. This especially accounts for intensive dairy
arms and arable farms with relatively high farm payments per
a in the initial situation. Production effects are less pronounced
ecause farm payments are decoupled although some re-allocation
f agricultural land between farm types and crops takes place. The
olicy switch towards a ﬂat rate decreases the total emissions of
utrients to the environment from agricultural production. More-
ver, the average dairy farm becomes more extensive. This gives
oom for further improvement of the environmental performance
t the farm level. These effects are ampliﬁed if risk is included in the
odel. Sensitivity analyses show that with the higher current agri-
ultural prices the magnitude of the changes are smaller. However,
he directions and relative changes in land allocation to individual
rops are comparable.The use of two different models with not the same reference
ctivity levels and not exact the same farm structure, and there-
ore, different elasticities causes some inevitable inconsistencies
etween the results of both models. Despite this CAPRI results forthe Netherlands as a whole show similar outcomes for group of
activities than DRAM. The size of the effect of the ﬂat rate is how-
ever smaller as supply elasticities of agricultural activities in CAPRI
are relatively small. This is especially the case for dairy cows. At
regional level the differences between CAPRI and DRAM can be
larger. This is mainly explained by the less detailed farm structure
in CAPRI, CAPRI e.g. does not take into account that in the initial
situation farm payments per ha per region can be different for the
same activity and it also does not take into account the effect of
the EU ﬂat rate on starch potatoes farms. This provokes an aggre-
gation error for the problem at hand. Linking both models is clearly
not optimal but still better than using ad hoc assumptions about
exogenous prices in DRAM.
AGMEMOD, an econometric, dynamic, multi-product partial
equilibrium model has also been used to analyse the effect of an
EU ﬂat rate for the Dutch agricultural sector (Berkhout et al., 2011).
AGMEMOD also shows relatively small effects on production. Com-
plementary to AGMEMOD, DRAM includes regional detail, farm
structure and differences in farm payments per activity per farm
type.
DRAM is a comparative static model. As such it is not able to
take into account the effects of decoupled payments on invest-
ments through changes in liquidity (a change in cash-ﬂow could
affect investment), credit (cost of debt could change with a lower
income), expectations (future payments can affect today’s pro-
duction decisions), and off-farm work decisions. It also does not
show the adjustment path. For the dairy and arable sector differ-
ent technologies (representing different farm types) per activity are
included. This does however, not solve the aggregation error as this
would require an individual farm models.
Despite these caveats the model is a ﬂexible tool to analyse the
introduction of a ﬂat rate in the Netherlands.
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